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WARRANTLESS MISDEMEANOR ARREST FOR
DRUNK DRIVING FOUND INVALID IN
SCHRAM v. DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA
Driving under the influence of alcohol has been recognized as a serious
public safety problem.1 Nationally, the social costs are staggering.2 In the
District of Columbia, the number of automobile accident fatalities connected
with alcohol use has risen over the last few years.3 In response to this prob-
1. See generally PRESIDENTIAL COMM'N ON DRUNK DRIVING, FINAL REPORT (1983).
The effect of alcohol consumption on driving ability has been documented. See, e.g., NAT'L
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP., ALCOHOL & TRAFFIC
SAFETY-A REVIEW OF THE KNOWLEDGE 17-19 (1979). Consumption of alcohol has been
strongly related to single-car accident fatalities. See Owens, McBay & Cook, The Use of Mari-
huana, Ethanol, and Other Drugs Among Drivers Killed in Single- Vehicle Crashes, 28 J. Fo-
RENSIC SCI. 372 (1983) (in a sample comprising blood from 169 persons killed in single-car
crashes, 66.9% of the sample (113) had .09% or more ethanol in their blood at the time of the
accident). Statistics also show the strong relationship between alcohol consumption and traffic
accidents. In 1980, for example, data from 29 states show that, in 46% of single- and multiple-
vehicle crashes, at least one driver had a blood alcohol content (BAC) of. 10% or more, and
that in an additional 11% of crashes, at least one driver had a BAC between .01% and .09%.
In 55% of single-vehicle crashes, the driver was legally intoxicated (BAC at least. 10%). See
NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP., ALCOHOL IN FATAL
ACCIDENTS NATIONAL ESTIMATES-U.S.A., 31, table 23 (1983). Time of day is an important
factor in alcohol-related accidents. In accidents occurring between midnight and 4:00 a.m.,
75% to 90% of fatally injured drivers had been drinking (had BAC of .01% or greater). See
NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP., FATAL ACCIDENT RE-
PORTING SYSTEM 18, Fig. 7 (1982) [hereinafter cited as FATAL ACCIDENT REPORTING SYS-
TEM].
In what is possibly the worst traffic accident in the history of the District of Columbia, seven
pedestrians were killed when an intoxicated driver lost control of his car and drove into a
crowded bus stop. United States v. Williams, No. F-05961-84 (D.C. Super. Ct. May 16, 1985).
Defendant Williams pled guilty to two counts of manslaughter while armed, five counts of
manslaughter, and one count of driving under the influence. Id. See Wash. Post, May 17,
1985, at Cl, col. 1.
2. In 1982, 43,721 persons died in traffic accidents in the United States. FATAL ACCI-
DENT REPORTING SYSTEM supra note 1, at 3. Data from 15 states with alcohol testing and
reporting show that in 1982, 48% of fatally injured drivers in those states had .10% or greater
BAC at the time of crash. Id. at 16.
3. In calendar year 1981, 33% of automobile accident fatalities were connected to alco-
hol use (of 51 fatalities, 17 were alcohol related); in 1982, 39% of the fatalities were connected
to alcohol use (14 of 36). 1982 D.C. ANN. TRAFFIC REP. 81. Figures for 1983 will be pub-
lished in the upcoming 1983 Annual Report. However, in 1983, 51% of automobile accident
fatalities were alcohol-related (37 of 72), and in 1984, as of August 14, 39% (13 of 33) were
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lem, the Metropolitan Police Department,4 the Corporation Counsel Crimi-
nal Division,5 and the Council of the District of Columbia6 have all directed
substantial effort to reducing the death toll associated with drunk driving.
In some drunk driving cases, successful prosecution of the offender may
be difficult due to technicalities in the law of arrest.7 These cases typically
involve circumstances in which a police officer arrives on the scene of an
alcohol-related. Telephone Interview with Officer Robert M. Goldstein, Metropolitan Police
Alcohol Coordinator, August 14, 1984.
4. Arrests for driving under the influence (DUI) of alcohol or other drugs, D.C. CODE
ANN. § 40-716(b)(1) (Supp. 1985), made by the Metropolitan Police Department in 1982
amounted to 3,826. In 1973, by comparison, only 991 DUI arrests were made. 1982 D.C.
ANN. TRAFFIC REP. 84. The large increase in the number of arrests is due in part to increased
enforcement carried out through the Alcohol Countermeasures Program. This program, im-
plemented in 1974, directs police resources to the detection and arrest of drunk drivers and has
been shown to be a statistically significant factor in the increase of DUI arrests and in the
reduction of alcohol-related traffic deaths. Id. at addendum.
5. The Criminal Division of the Corporation Counsel prosecuted ("papered") 3,299 DUI
cases in fiscal year 1982, The D.C. Superior Court disposed of 2,193.of these cases and 1,957
convictions were obtained. CORPORATION COUNSEL FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 1982
ANN. REP. 27-28, 31 (1983). In calendar year 1981, 3,349 DUI cases were papered. The
superior court disposed of 2,339 of these, and convictions resulted in 1,960 cases. Council of
the District of Columbia, Report on Bill No. 4-389, the Anti-Drunk Driving Act of 1982,
attachment c (1982).
6. The Council of the District of Columbia amended D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-716 (1981)
by passage of the "Anti-Drunk Driving Act of 1982," D.C. Law 4-145, on Sept. 14, 1982. One
purpose of this act is to establish a per se offense of driving while intoxicated when a suspect's
blood alcohol content (BAC) is .10% or greater, D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-716(b)(1) (Supp.
1985), and to stiffen penalties for second and subsequent DUI violations, id. Council of the
District of Columbia, Report on Bill No. 4-389, the Anti-Drunk Driving Act of 1982, at 1.
The significance of the per se rule is apparent when it is considered that four drinks (i.e., four
twelve ounce glasses of beer) can result in. 11% BAC and legal intoxication of a person weigh-
ing 140 lbs. 1982 D.C. ANN. TRAFFIC REP., chart at 77. The effect of the penalty provision is
shown by the change in possible penalty. Prior to the amendment, a second or subsequent
offense could result in a fine of "not more than $1,000" or imprisonment for "not more than 1
year, or both." D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-716(b) (1981). The law, as amended, provides for a fine
"not to exceed $5,000" or imprisonment for "not more than 1 year or both" upon conviction
of a second DUI offense within 15 years. D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-716(b)(1) (Supp. 1985). See
1982 D.C. ANN. TRAFFIC REP. 78-80 (analyzing changes to the law brought about by the
Anti-Drunk Driving Act). The Council is currently considering on amendment to the arrest
provisions that should facilitate conviction for drunk driving. See infra note 96.
7. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jacoby, 226 Pa. Super. 19, 311 A.2d 666 (1973) (evidence
of blood alcohol content of .20% suppressed where warrantless misdemeanor arrest was
invalid); Commonwealth v. Reeves, 223 Pa. Super. 51, 297 A.2d 142 (1972) (blood test results
properly suppressed where defendant was illegally arrested). In the context of arrests for other
kinds of misdemeanors, see Maghan v. Jerome, 88 F.2d 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (false arrest suit
brought against officers after plaintiff was released following arrest for larceny); State v. Koil,
103 W. Va. 19, 136 S.E. 510 (1927) (conviction for possession of liquor set aside and evidence
ruled inadmissible where arresting officer had no basis for belief that offense was committed in
his presence).
Congress facilitated prosecution of some drug offenses in D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-502(b)
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alcohol-related accident after the accident has occurred and when the intoxi-
cated driver is no longer driving the vehicle.8 Under both the common law9
and a statutory formulation of the common law,' the arrest of the intoxi-
(1981) by allowing warrantless misdemeanor arrests on probable cause rather than on the
more restrictive presence standard. United States v. Hamilton, 390 A.2d 449, 452 (D.C. 1978).
8. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Schram, No. T-526-83 (D.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 15,
1983) 112 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 165 (Jan 26, 1984) (arresting officer found driver standing
outside car); Jacoby, 226 Pa. Super. at 21, 311 A.2d at 666-67 (1973) (driver found standing
outside car); State v. Macuk, 57 N.J. 1, 5, 268 A.2d 1, 3 (1970) (driver found sitting on porch
of house near his car). Cases where the drunk driving offense is not viewed by the arresting
officer are not uncommon in the District of Columbia. During the period January 1, 1985,
through January 14, 1985, 18 DUI cases showing this characteristic were referred to the office
of Corporation Counsel by the law enforcement officers. Motion for Rehearing of Appellee at
affidavit of William L. Davis, Schram v. District of Columbia, No. 83-1534 (1984).
9. In John Bad Elk v. United States, 177 U.S. 529, 534 (1900), the Supreme Court noted
that "an officer, at common law, was not authorized to make an arrest without a warrant, for a
mere misdemeanor not committed in his presence." In Bad Elk, the misdemeanor arrest rule
was employed as a defense to reduce a charge of murder to manslaughter. Id. The crime of
homicide was mitigated where defendant killed to resist an unlawful arrest. This arrest was
unlawful because the victim police officer was attempting to carry out an arrest for a misde-
meanor not committed in his presence. Id. at 534-37. See Garske v. United States, 1 F.2d 620,
622-23 (8th Cir. 1924) (discussing the common law misdemeanor arrest rule); Reeves, 223 Pa.
Super. at 53-54, 297 A.2d at 143 (noting the historical origin of the rule). The rationale for
this rule governing warrantless misdemeanor arrests is that persons should be arrested for
committing a petty offense only where the police officer knows from his own senses that the
suspect has committed the offense. The suspect should not be arrested on probable cause to
believe that he or she committed the petty offense as is the case with more serious crimes such
as felonies. Furthermore, where the police officer has no firsthand knowledge that the suspect
committed the offense, the public should be secure from petty crime arrests that are un-
supervised by the judiciary through warrant procedures. State v. Morse, 54 N.J. 32, 35, 252
A.2d 723, 725 (1969). The rule has been attacked as not in keeping with the reality of contem-
porary law enforcement where arrested persons are usually released the day after arrest rather
than after months or years, as was the case in tL old English society where the rule developed.
Cave v. Cooley, 48 N.M. 478, 484, 152 P.2d 886, 890 (1944) (citing Note, The Uniform Arrest
Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315, 331 (1942)). Reform of the common law rule was recommended by
the American Law Institute (ALI) in the MODEL CODE OF PREARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE
§ 120.1 (1975). The Interstate Commission on Crime also recommended changes in the rule.
Note, supra at 331-34. The law of arrest in the District of Columbia follows the ALI sugges-
tion so that warrantless arrests for specified misdemeanors (theft, assault, shoplifting, and un-
lawful entry) can be made on probable cause where the suspect may destroy evidence, escape
apprehension or injure others. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-581(a)(I)(C) (1981). A recent trend
among jurisdictions has been to allow warrantless arrests for misdemeanor assaults or for
spouse abuse based on probable cause. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.341 (West 1983 & Supp.
1985); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 764.15a (West 1982); OR. REV. STAT. § 133.055(2)
(1983); VA. CODE § 19.2-81 (Supp. 1984).
For a comprehensive analysis of the concept and mechanics of warrantless arrest as well as
an analysis of the presence standard for misdemeanor arrests, see Wilgus, Arrest Without War-
rant, 22 MICH. L. REV. 541 (1924).
10. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-581(a)(1)(B) (1981) (providing that arrest can be
made without a warrant where the misdemeanor is committed in the officer's presence); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 594:10 (1974) (providing that warrantless misdemeanor arrests can be
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cated driver under these circumstances can be viewed as illegal. This is be-
cause a warrantless arrest for the misdemeanor11 of driving while intoxicated
can legally be made only when the offense is committed in the arresting of-
ficer's presence. 12 Consequently, evidence gained (blood, urine, or breath
test results) following an arrest that violates this legal requirement would be
suppressed as the fruit of an illegal arrest.1"
Whether such an arrest is actually illegal, however, depends on the inter-
pretation given to the legal requirement for warrantless misdemeanor ar-
rests. Some courts have interpreted this requirement narrowly. These
courts have held that the offense, driving while intoxicated, is committed in
the arresting officer's presence only when the officer actually observes the
suspect driving the car.14 Other courts have taken a broader view of the
requirement. These courts, in contrast, have held that the offense is commit-
ted in the officer's presence when the intoxicated suspect admits to the officer
that he or she drove the car, even though the officer did not observe the
act. 15
made where the offense has been committed in the officer's presence). Most of the D.C. Code
arrest provisions are a codification of the common law of arrest. Hamilton, 390 A.2d at 452.
11. In the District of Columbia, driving under the influence is a misdemeanor because the
possible penalty is not more than one year imprisonment. D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-716(b)(1)
(Supp. 1985). Under 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1982), which is applicable to the District of Columbia,
Maghan, 88 F.2d at 1002, offenses punishable by less than one year in jail are misdemeanors.
12. Jacoby, 226 Pa. Super. at 21, 311 A.2d at 667; State v. Eubanks, 283 N.C. 556, 559,
196 S.E.2d 706, 708 (1973).
13. See Jacoby, 226 Pa. Super. at 22, 311 A.2d at 667; see also Reeves, 223 Pa. Super. at
54-55, 297 A.2d at 144. But see People v. Burdo, 56 Mich. App. 48, 51-52, 223 N.W.2d 358,
360 (1974) (holding that, although arrest was contrary to state law, probable cause justified
arrest, and no constitutional violation occurred so that suppression was not warranted); Eu-
banks, 283 N.C. at 559-60, 196 S.E.2d at 708-09 (same). The exclusionary rule, which pro-
vides that evidence gained through an illegal arrest or illegal search may not be admitted at
trial, was formulated in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and applied to the states
in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have provided a
"good faith exception" to the rule, United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984) (exclusionary
rule does not apply to evidence gained through reasonable reliance on a search warrant later
found to be invalid), and an "inevitable discovery" exception, Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501
(1984) (evidence gained through a violation of defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel is
not suppressed where the evidence inevitably would have been discovered had the violation not
taken place).
14. District of Columbia v. Harvey, No. T-1 192-84 (D.C. Super. Ct. June 25, 1984); Eu-
banks, 283 N.C. at 559, 196 S.E.2d at 708; Jacoby, 226 Pa. Super. at 21, 311 A.2d at 667. This
strict view was applied with a different result in Garske, 1 F.2d at 625-26 (the offense, posses-
sion of liquor, was committed in officer's presence when officer saw defendant carrying a pack-
age which had the "outlines of. . . two pint whisky bottles").
15. Schram, 112 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 171, col. 3. City of Oregon v. Szakovitz, 32 Ohio
St. 2d 271, 274, 291 N.E.2d 742, 744 (1972); Macuk, 57 N.J. at 7, 268 A.2d at 4. See also State
v. Allen, 2 Ohio App. 3d 441, 442-3, 442 N.E.2d 784, 786, (1981) (arrest valid where defend-
ant admitted to driving and was found outside car); State v. Dickens, 130 N.J. Super. 73, 75-
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The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in a per curiam opinion, nar-
rowly interpreted the warrantless misdemeanor arrest requirement in
Schram v. District of Columbia.16 In Schram, the court held that a warrant-
less arrest for drunk driving was invalid where the arresting officer arrived
on the scene after the defendant was no longer inside her car. The trial court.
had taken the broader view of the warrantless misdemeanor arrest require-
ment and had held that the warrantless arrest was legal, even though the
arresting officer did not personally witness the act of drunk driving.17
Prior to defendant Schram's arrest for driving under the influence, she had
been driving her car alone in the early morning of January 23, 1983. A
pedestrian observed Schram's car veer into the parking lane and collide with
a parked car at the intersection of 24th Street and New Hampshire Avenue,
N.W. This collision in turn caused another parked car to collide into a car
standing at a stop sign. The driver of this car pursued Schram and suc-
ceeded in detaining her at Washington Circle, N.W., a short distance away
from the accident. Both this driver and the pedestrian saw Schram sitting
behind the wheel of her car when it was brought to a stop. Soon afterward, a
Metropolitan Police Officer arrived and found Schram standing outside her
car. Schram admitted to the officer that she had been drinking. The officer,
noting her intoxication, arrested Schram for driving while intoxicated. No
warrant was obtained prior to this arrest.18
At trial, in December, 1983, Schram moved to suppress the results of a
breathalyzer test.9 Schram's theory for suppression was that a warrantless
misdemeanor arrest is legal only when the misdemeanor is committed in the
arresting officer's presence. In this case, however, the arresting officer had
arrived on the scene after Schram had stopped her car and had stepped out
of it. Therefore, Schram argued, she was not driving the car in the officer's
presence, and the offense of driving while intoxicated was not committed in
the officer's presence. The warrantless arrest for driving while intoxicated
was thus illegal.2°
Trial Judge Revercomb denied Schram's motion and held that the offense
77, 325 A.2d 353, 354-55 (1974) (warrantless arrest proper when, in addition to admitting to
driving, defendant was found asleep in the car with motor running). Cf State v. Martin, 275
S.C. 141, 145-6, 268 S.E.2d 105, 107 (1980) (warrantless DUI arrest proper where officer finds
offense "freshly committed").
16. 485 A.2d 623 (D.C. 1985).
17. Schram, 112 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 171, col. 3.
18. Id. at 165, col. 3, 169, col. 3, 170, col. 1.
19. A breathalyzer test administered to Schram after her arrest showed a blood alcohol
content of .27%. Schram, 485 A.2d at 624. Per se intoxication is .10%. D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 40-716(b)(1) (Supp. 1985).
20. 112 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 170, col. 1.
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of driving while intoxicated, under the circumstances of this case, was com-
mitted in the arresting officer's presence. 2' The court reasoned that the po-
lice officer may use all his senses to determine whether an offense has been
committed in his presence. Because Schram admitted to driving the car and
could have been the only driver of the car, the arresting officer was justified
in concluding that Schram committed the offense in his presence. After
trial, Schram was convicted of driving while intoxicated. 22
The court of appeals disagreed with the trial court's interpretation of the
presence requirement. It held that the statutory requirement for a warrant-
less misdemeanor arrest was not met because the officer did not see Schram
drive the car. The arrest was thus illegal. Consequently, the breathalyzer
test results must be suppressed, and Schram's conviction reversed, the court
said.23
The divergence of views manifest in this case on the issue of what consti-
tutes presence follows the pattern seen in cases from other jurisdictions.24
Before looking more closely at the rationales of the trial court and of the
appeals court, this Note will examine some of the cases from other jurisdic-
tions. These cases will illustrate the main split of opinion on the issue of
determining when an offense is committed in the presence of an officer.
I. THE MEANING OF "PRESENCE" IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
The Supreme Court of Ohio, in City of Oregon v. Szakovits, 25 held that a
warrantless arrest for operating an automobile under the influence of alcohol
may be legal when the arresting officer does not view the actual operation of
the defendant's car.26 Two cases were combined in City of Oregon, and in
each case the arresting officer arrived on the scene after the accident had
occurred and found the defendant's vehicle stationary. In one case, the de-
fendant was found standing outside the vehicle, and in the other, the defend-
ant was found seated in the driver's seat. Each defendant admitted to
driving his respective car, and each showed signs of alcohol intoxication.
21. Schram, 112 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 171, col. 3.
22. Defendant Schram received a ten-day suspended sentence, one year probation, and a
$100 fine. Schram, No. T-526-83, (D.C. Super. Ct. Dec. 15, 1983).
23. Schram v. District of Columbia, 485 A.2d at 624-25. The District of Columbia Cor-
poration Counsel filed a petition for rehearing on January 28, 1985. It was denied on April 17,
1985, with Judges Pryor and Nebeker in favor of a rehearing en banc. Schram, No. 83-1534
(1984).
24. For a compilation of cases illustrating the differing views on when a drunk driving
offense is committed in the arresting officer's presence, see Annot., 74 A.L.R.3d 1138 (1976).
25. 32 Ohio St. 2d 271, 291 N.E.2d 742 (1972).
26. City of Oregon, 32 Ohio St. 2d at 272, 291 N.E.2d at 743.
1246 [Vol. 34:1241
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Although the court did not discuss the scope of the presence rule,2 7 the court
quickly determined that the facts of each case were sufficient to show that
"the officers properly found each [defendant] to have been violating an ordi-
nance . . . prohibiting driving while under the influence of alcohol.",21
Thus, the Ohio Supreme Court has taken a liberal view of what constitutes
presence by expanding this requirement for warrantless misdemeanor arrests
to include those situations where an intoxicated defendant admits to the ar-
resting officer that he or she had been driving.
Reaching a similar result, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, in State v.
Macuk,29 ruled that driving under the influence of alcohol is committed in
the arresting officer's presence when a defendant admits to the officer that he
had been driving the car, even though the officer did not witness the act.3°
In Macuk, the defendant's car was found unoccupied in a ditch, and the
defendant was found sitting on the porch of a nearby house. In response to
the officer's question, the defendant, who showed signs of intoxication, ad-
mitted to driving the car into the ditch.31 The supreme court, in reply to the
defendant's claim that the arrest was illegal because the arresting officer did
not see him drive the car, stated that the presence requirement could be met
27. Ohio law applied in City of Oregon does not employ the same language in authorizing
misdemeanor arrests as does that of the District of Columbia. The former authorizes a war-
rantless arrest when a suspect is "found violating" a law, OHIO REV. CODE § 2935.03(A)
(Page 1982), while the latter authorizes such an arrest when the offense is committed in the
officer's "presence". D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-581(a)(1)(B) (1981). While the "found violating"
standard may allow for broader exercise of arrest authority, Ohio courts have construed this
language as having an effect similar to the presence language. See e.g., Allen, 2 Ohio App. 3d
at 442, 442 N.E. 2d at 785, (offense must be committed "in-presence" for warrantless misde-
meanor arrest to be valid, and citing to Ohio statute providing the "found violating"
language).
28. City of Oregon, 32 Ohio St. 2d at 274, 291 N.E.2d at 744. Nine years after City of
Oregon was decided by the Ohio Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals of Ohio reached a
similar result on facts similar to those in City of Oregon. Allen, 2 Ohio App. 3d at 442-3, 442
N.E.2d at 785. Although the Ohio Supreme Court does not characterize its holding as an
exception to the rule on warrantless misdemeanor arrests, the Ohio Court of Appeals does so
characterize the City of Oregon holding. Id. at 442, 442 N.E.2d at 785-86. Also in Allen, the
court of appeals went further than the holding in City of Oregon and stated in dicta that a
violation of state law that was not also a constitutional violation did not require suppression of
evidence gained through that illegal arrest. Id. at 442, 442 N.E.2d at 786. This dicta agrees
with the holding of the North Carolina Supreme Court in Eubanks, infra note 43 and accom-
panying text.
29. 57 N.J. at 1, 268 A.2d at 1.
30. Id. at 8, 268 A.2d at 4-5. Four years after this result in Macuk, the Superior Court of
New Jersey followed this holding in Dickens, 130 N.J. Super. at 77, 325 A.2d at 355, where it
ruled that a warrantless arrest for drunk driving was committed "in-presence" after the intoxi-
cated defendant admitted that he had been driving the car. Defendant in Dickens was found
asleep in his car with the motor running by the arresting officer. Id. at 75, 325 A.2d at 354.
31. Macuk, 57 N.J. at 5, 268 A.2d at 3.
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by the officer's "use of his senses."'32 In addition, the court found that "an
admission of the offense to the officer by the defendant . .. [was] suffi-
cient ' 33 to constitute knowledge that the offense was committed in the of-
ficer's presence. Based on this reasoning, the court found the arrest of the
defendant legal because the arrest was made after the arresting officer had
knowledge that the offense had been committed in his presence.
3 4
A more rigid view of the presence requirement was set out by the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Jacoby.35 In this case, the court
reached a result inconsistent with the view of the Ohio Supreme Court in
City of Oregon 6 and with the view of the New Jersey Supreme Court in
Macuk 37 on facts substantially similar to those of both cases. In Jacoby, the
arresting officer arrived on the accident scene to find defendant's car unoccu-
pied and the defendant standing outside the car. The defendant admitted to
driving the car. After his arrest for driving while intoxicated, the defendant
showed a blood alcohol content of .20%.38 The trial court, applying a ra-
tionale similar to that in Macuk,39 where the defendant's admission was suf-
ficient to justify arrest, found the arrest legal.4 The superior court took the
opposite stance, however, stating that "the statutory requirement" that the
offense be committed in the officer's presence to justify warrantless arrest
may not be ignored "by the existence of an incriminating statement by the
appellant."4 The court indicated that the arrest was illegal because the po-
32. 57 N.J. at 8, 268 A.2d at 5 (quoting State v. Smith, 37 N.J. 481, 495 (1962), cert.
denied, 374 U.S. 835 (1963)).
33. 57 N.J. at 8, 268 A.2d at 5 (citing State v. Morse, 54 N.J. 32, 35-36, 252 A.2d 723,
725-26 (1969)). The reasoning that defendant's admission contributes to the officer's knowl-
edge that the offense was committed "in-presence" was similarily rejected in Jacoby, see infra
note 35 and accompanying text, and accepted by Judge Revercomb of the District of Columbia
Superior Court in Schram, see infra note 50 and accompanying text. It is significant to note in
Macuk that the court justified defendant's forced subjection to intoxication testing by pointing
out the risk of loss of evidence of an offense that "poses an extremely grave menace to the
public safety .... "Macuk, 57 N.J. at 8, 268 A.2d at 5 (quoting State v. Gillespie, 100 N.J.
Super. 71, 85, 241 A.2d 239, 247 (1968), cert. denied, 51 N.J. 274, 239 A.2d 663 (1968)). This
justification was employed by Judge Revercomb of the District of Columbia Superior Court in
Schram to bolster his holding. Schram, 112 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 172, col. 1. Also in
Macuk, Miranda warnings advising a person of his right to refuse testing for intoxication was
found to be "inappropriate" becalise defendant had "no legal right or choice to refuse" testing.
57 N.J. at 15, 268 A.2d at 8.
34. Macuk, 57 N.J. at 8, 268 A.2d at 5.
35. 226 Pa. Super. at 19, 311 A.2d at 666.
36. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
37. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
38. Jacoby, 226 Pa. Super. at 21, 311 A.2d at 667. See supra note 6 for a discussion of per
se legal intoxication at BAC. 10% in the contest of statutory penalties for drunk driving.
39. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
40. Jacoby, 226 Pa. Super. at 21, 311 A.2d at 667.
41. Id. at 22, 311 A.2d at 667. In a case decided one year prior to Jacoby, the Superior
1248 [Vol. 34:1241
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lice officer "never saw the appellant driving the car."42 Thus, the court re-
jected the broader view taken by the Ohio and New Jersey courts and
dictated that a warrantless misdemeanor arrest is legal only when the arrest-
ing officer actually observes the defendant operating the car.
A similar interpretation of the presence requirement was employed by the
Supreme Court of North Carolina in State v. Eubanks.43 Yet, while this
court followed an approach reflecting the strict view of the presence require-
ment,14 it refused to suppress the evidence after the arrest was found to be
illegal.45 In Eubanks, the arresting officer arrived at the scene of the acci-
dent to find the defendant standing outside his stationary car. In response to
the officer's question, the defendant admitted to driving the car. Defendant
Eubanks exhibited signs of intoxication and was arrested for driving under
the influence.46 The supreme court found that the arrest in this case was
illegal because the "defendant did not operate his motor vehicle. . . 'in the
presence of the officer' "" as required by statute. Although the arrest was
illegal, the trial court's denial of the motion to supress was not erroneous
because, in the court's view, suppression is required only when the arrest is
unconstitutional: "[T]he words 'illegal' and 'unconstitutional' are not sy-
nonymous. . . . Thus an arrest may be constitutionally valid and yet 'ille-
gal' under state law."4 Here, the arrest was constitutionally valid because
the arresting officer had probable cause to believe that defendant was operat-
Court of Pennsylvania reached a similar result on facts similar to those in Jacoby with the
exception that no mention was made of any admission by defendant to the arresting officer tha,
he was driving the car prior to the accident. Reeves, 223 Pa. Super. at 51, 297 A.2d at 142. In
Reeves, the court bolstered its holding with reference to the historic roots of the presence
requirement and noted the rule's basis in The Charter of Magna Carta. Id. at 53, 297 A.2d at
143. In so doing, the court lends credence to the claim that the rule is often applied for
historic reasons only, and not because the offense is a petty one. In actuality, the offense of
drunk driving is one which presents great danger to the public, and on this basis arrest even on
probable cause could be justified.
42. Jacoby, 226 Pa. Super. at 21, 311 A.2d at 667.
43. Eubanks, 283 N.C. at 556, 196 S.E.2d at 706.
44. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
45. Eubanks, 283 N.C. at 560, 196 S.E.2d at 709.
46. Id. at 557-58, 196 S.E.2d at 707.
47. Id. at 559, 196 S.E.2d at 708 (quoting State v. Hill, 277 N.C. 547, 178 S.E.2d 462
(1971)). North Carolina law allows warrantless arrests for certain misdemeanors to be made
when the offense is not committed in the presence of the arresting officer. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-401(b)(2) (1983). This statutory provision employing the probable cause standard for
certain warrantless misdemeanor arrests is similar to D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-581 (a)(1)(C)
(1981). Neither statute, however, makes this special provision for warrantless arrests for driv-
ing while intoxicated.
A proposed amendment to D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-581 (1981 & Supp. 1985) would allow the
arrest for drunk driving on probable cause. D.C. Major Traffic Offense Arrest Act of 1985,
Bill No. 6-85 (submitted to the D.C. Council Jan. 14, 1985). See infra note 96.
48. Eubanks, 283 N.C. at 559, 196 S.E.2d at 708.
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ing a vehicle while intoxicated.49
In this brief survey, two distinct views have emerged concerning the pres-
ence requirement for warrantless misdemeanor arrests. This test under the
liberal view includes a more expansive definition of the knowledge of the
arresting officer. The officer's knowledge under this view encompasses all
that he or she observes, including defendant's admission, to determine
whether an offense is committed in his or her presence. The officer's knowl-
edge under the more rigid view of the presence test, however, includes his or
her observations of defendant's criminal acts, but not defendant's admission
of those same acts. At the District of Columbia Superior Court, Judge
Revercomb's task in Schram was to select from these competing views and
to forge a workable definition of the presence requirement.
II. THE BROAD VIEW APPLIED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT: AN
ARRESTING OFFICER'S KNOWLEDGE INCLUDES
COMMON SENSE
In District of Columbia v. Schram,5° Judge Revercomb of the Superior
Court of the District of Columbia ruled that the offense of driving under the
influence of alcohol was committed in the arresting officer's presence when
the officer arrived on the accident scene to find the defendant standing
outside her stationary car.51 In Schram, the defendant admitted to driving
the car and was arrested without a warrant after the police officer noted her
signs of alcohol intoxication.5 2 At trial, the defendent filed a motion to sup-
press both the results of a breathalyzer test and statements made by her at
the time of arrest. The basis for this motion was the defendant's claim that
the presence requirement for warrantless misdemeanor arrests was not met
in this case because the arresting officer arrived on the scene when the de-
fendant was no longer operating her car. Therefore, Schram argued, the
offense of driving while intoxicated was not committed in the officer's pres-
ence. The presence requirement was not met, and as a consequence, the
arrest was illegal.53 In denying the motion, Judge Revercomb held that "the
offenses charged54 were, in fact, committed in the presence of the arresting
49. Id. at 560, 196 S.E.2d at 708-09. Two years before Eubanks, the North Carolina
Supreme Court also held an arrest for driving while intoxicated invalid for the same reasons as
in Eubanks. Hill, 277 N.C. at 547, 178 S.E.2d at 462. The court in Hill, however, did not take
the same view on admissibility that was taken in Eubanks, but reversed the conviction on sixth
amendment grounds. Id. at 554, 178 S.E.2d at 466.
50. 112 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 165, col. 1.
51. Id. at 171, col. 3.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 170, col. 1.
54. Schram was arrested for driving without a license, D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-301(d)
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",55officer ... .
The test employed by the court in reaching this result was whether "a
misdemeanor is committed in the presence of the officer when, with the aid
of all his senses and what is common knowledge under the circumstances,
the officer has knowledge that such is the case." 56 The court then analyzed
the facts of the case showing that the officer had knowledge that the offense
was committed in his presence. First, the officer arrived on the scene shortly
after the accident occurred. Second, the officer observed the vehicle that
caused the accident and saw the defendant standing a few feet away from it.
Third, the officer heard the defendant admit to him that she was the driver
of the car that caused the accident. Fourth, the officer noted clear signs that
the defendant was intoxicated. Finally, the officer saw that no one else could
have been driving the defendant's vehicle." In light of these facts, the court
was "convinced" that the arresting officer could conclude, just prior to the
arrest, that the defendant was operating her vehicle while intoxicated.58
The court, however, in express language, limited the effect of its holding
only to those future cases containing facts similar to the specific facts in
Schram. 9 Thus, the court's ruling that drunk driving is committed "in-
presence" would govern only those cases where the arresting officer: (1) ar-
rives on the scene shortly after the accident occurs; (2) obtains an admission
from defendant that the defendant has been driving; (3) notes the defend-
ant's intoxication; and (4) sees that no one else but the defendant could have
(Supp. 1985), and for driving while intoxicated, D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-716(b)(1) (Supp. 1985).
The disposition of these charges was: Nolle Prosequi as to the former, conviction as to the
latter. Schram, No. T-526-83 (D.C. Super Ct. Dec. 15, 1983).
55. Schram, 112 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 171, col. 3. In a case similar toSchram, a war-
rantless misdemeanor arrest was held to be legal where defendant was sitting in his car at the
time the arresting officer arrived on the scene. Finding that "operating" a motor vehicle in-
cluded sitting behind the steering wheel of a stationary car, the court concluded that the of-
fense of either failing to show a license or of operating without a driver's license was
committed in the officer's presence. Taylor v. United States, 259 A.2d 835 (D.C. 1969). The
court of appeals reached a different result in District of Columbia v. Perry, 215 A.2d 845 (D.C.
1966). In Perry, the defendant was standing outside his car when the police officer arrived, and
the court found that the warrantless misdemeanor arrest was illegal. Even though the defend-
ant in Perry was about to drive off when arrested, the court concluded that the arrest was
illegal because the offense of driving under the influence was not committed in the officer's
presence. Id. at 847-48. Thus, Perry serves as a forceful rebuttal to an argument in support of
the superior court's holding in Schram. The court of appeals saw Perry as controlling their
decision. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
56. Schram, 112 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 171, col. 3 (quoting Taylor, 259 A.2d at 837).
This test appears in slightly different form in Ex Parte Morrill, 35 F. 261, 267 (C.C.D. Ore.
1888), and in Koil, 103 W. Va. at 22, 136 S.E. at 511.
57. Schram, 112 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 171, col. 3.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 172. col. 1.
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been driving the car that is involved in the accident.' By so limiting the
prospective effect of its holding, the court hopes to avoid over-extension of
the holding to subsequent cases where no admission by the defendant is ob-
tained, or where the defendant is not clearly the operator of the car. Thus,
for arrests to be found legal in future cases similar to Schram, more than just
an admission by intoxicated drivers must be obtained.
With this specification of additional factors to justify an officer's belief that
an offense is being committed in his presence, the court avoids the broader
holding of Macuk61 where an admission by the defendant was by itself suffi-
cient to meet the presence requirement.62 The court gives the appearance of
limiting police intrusions into the liberty of citizens by so requiring, as does
the court in City of Oregon,63 a number of specific factors to substantiate the
officer's belief that the offense was committed in his presence.64
Balanced against this liberty interest, however, is the public safety issue
which provides great pressure for a broad view of the presence requirement
in drunk driving cases.65 The danger to the public inherent in drunk driving
is implicitly recognized by the court,6 6 as is the need to make drunk driving
arrests before evidence of blood alcohol level is lost.67 Responding to these
considerations in its analysis of the presence rule, the court was able to allow
the use of such evidence at trial by ruling the arrest legal when a driver who
is obviously intoxicated admits to driving just moments before the admis-
sion. 68
By reaching a result facilitating arrest and prosecution of certain drunk
60. Id.
61. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. Although the superior court characterizes
City of Oregon ruling as an "exception" to the Ohio "in-presence" rule, Schram, 112 Daily
Wash. L. Rep. at 171, col. 3, no such characterization is found in the Ohio Supreme Court's
opinion. City of Oregon, 32 Ohio St. 2d at 273-74, 291 N.E.2d at 743-44. Rather, the Ohio
Supreme Court placed its holding squarely within the statutory language authorizing warrant-
less arrests. Id. at 274, 291 N.E.2d at 744. Characterization of City of Oregon as an "excep-
tion" appears in Allen, 2 Ohio App. 3d at 442, 442 N.E.2d at 785-86.
64. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
65. For statistics illustrating the need for more stringent enforcement of laws against
drunk driving, see supra notes 1, 2 and 3. Because of the great potential for injury to the
public, courts have called for legislative modification of the law of arrest so as to eliminate the
requirement that drunk driving be committed in the arresting officer's presence to justify
arrest. See, e.g., Reeves, 223 Pa. Super. at 55, 297 A.2d at 144 (Packel, J., concurring).
66. Schram, 112 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 172,.col. 1.
67. Id. Both the danger to the public and the need to make a prompt arrest are recog-
nized in the proposed amendment to the D.C. Code provision for warrantless arrest. See infra
note 96.
68. Id. at 171. col. 3.
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drivers, the court rejects the narrow view of Jacoby69 and notes that the
presence requirement applied in Schram involves a broader concept7° than
that employed in Jacoby. This broader concept of "in-presence" employed
in Schram, in contrast to the narrower "in view" '7 1 concept applied in
Jacoby, allows the court greater latitude in reviewing the validity of a war-
rantless misdemeanor arrest. Thus, the court is able to accept the officer's
use of his senses72 and common knowledge73 to determine that the offense is
committed in his presence, whereas under the narrower "in view" concept,
the officer would need to see the car being driven in order for the offense to
be committed in his presence.74 In effect, common sense may indicate in
either case that the offense has been committed, but under the narrower
view, common sense is supplanted by a technicality.
Having so taken the broader view of the presence requirement, the court
does not employ the rationale of the North Carolina court in Eubanks.7 In
Eubanks, the court found a way to avoid a newer, dynamic interpretation of
presence yet ensure that drunk driving will not go unpunished. It ruled that,
although the arrest did not meet the statutory standard, 76 no suppression of
evidence of intoxication was required because no constitutional violation oc-
curred.77 Such sciamachy in searching for compromise is unnecessary in
Schram where the court, after considering the scope of the presence require-
ment, adopts the more liberal interpretation of this concept.
III. THE NARROW VIEW PREVAILS AT THE COURT OF APPEALS
Defendant Schram appealed the trial court's denial of her suppression mo-
tion. The court of appeals agreed with Schram and found that the trial judge
committed reversable error in denying her motion to suppress.78
The test employed by the court of appeals in reaching this result was dis-
tinctly different from that employed by the trial court. 79 The court took the
narrow view of the presence requirement, applied the arrest statute strictly,
69. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
70. This broader concept is labeled a "less restricted spatial concept" by the court.
Schram, 112 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 171, col. 3 (quoting Thomas v. United States, 134 U.S.
App. D.C. 48, 412 F.2d 1095, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).
71. Jacoby, 226 Pa. Super. at 21, 311 A.2d at 667.
72. Schram, 112 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 171, col. 3.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
76. Eubanks, 283 N.C. at 559, 196 S.E.2d at 708.
77. Id. at 560, 196 S.E.2d at 708-09.
78. Schram, 485 A.2d at 623.
79. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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and asked whether the facts showed that the defendant was "operating or in
physical control of her car in the presence of the police .. ,. o Using this
test, the court avoided the broader reading of presence which the trial court
had employed. No discussion was made of this broader test as the court
immediately adopted the narrow test.
Applying this narrow test to the facts, the court easily found that no of-
fense was committed in the officer's presence. The court was guided by Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Perry"1 in reaching this result. In Perry, the defendant
was standing outside his car when the arresting officer arrived. The misde-
meanor arrest that followed was invalid in that case because the officer did
not see the driver operating the car.8 2 Evidence taken following this arrest
was suppressed. The court saw no difference between Perry and Schram and
considered Perry to be controlling.8 3
Arguing for the application of the broader construction of presence, the
District of Columbia cited Taylor v. United States84 as support. In Taylor,
Chief Judge Hood held that the defendant was operating a car within the
presence of police officers where he had been sitting in the driver's seat when
the police arrived on the scene of an accident. Chief Judge Hood employed
the broad test of presence in his rationale.8" The court of appeals, however,
rejected the government's use of the Taylor rationale. The court distin-
guished Taylor by pointing out that the defendant in Taylor was seated in
the car when the police observed him, while in Schram, the defendant was
standing outside the car.8 6 In the former, the defendant was operating a
vehicle in the officer's presence, while in the latter, the defendant was not.
In so distinguishing Schram and Taylor, the court avoided an extension of
the broad view of presence to include those cases where the defendant is
outside the car when the police arrive on the scene.
By taking this narrow view of what constitutes presence, the court implic-
itly followed the view taken by the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Com-
monwealth v. Jacoby.7 Courts taking this view adhere strictly to the
language of the arrest statute and refuse to engage in judicial amendment to
statutory language. While neither this rationale nor Jacoby itself was men-
80. Schram, 485 A.2d at 624.
81. 215 A.2d 845 (D.C. 1966).
82. Id. at 847-48.
83. Schram, 485 A.2d at 624.
84. 259 A.2d at 835.
85. Id. at 837-38.
86. Schram, 485 A.2d at 625.
87. 226 Pa. Super. at 19, 311 A.2d at 666. For a discussion of Jacoby, see supra note 35
and accompanying text.
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tioned by the court, the rationale nonetheless appears to have guided the
court's decision.
In Schram, the court of appeals expressly rejected the approach taken by
the North Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Eubanks."8 In the Eubanks
approach, the existence of probable cause to arrest was seen as sufficient to
avoid suppression even though the arrest was invalid by the statutory arrest
standard. The District of Columbia had argued on appeal in Schram for the
Eubanks view as an alternative method to uphold the trial court's decision.
The court of appeals dealt summarily with this argument. 9 It held that
suppression was called for by Perry as well as by Miller v. United States."
In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that even though police
officers had probable cause to make a warrantless arrest, the arrest was inva-
lid because the officers failed to announce their authority and purpose before
breaking a door to make the arrest.91 The basis for this result is the rule that
the police must announce their authority and purpose before breaking in the
door in order to execute an arrest warrant or to make a warrantless arrest of
a defendant within the home.92 Officers in Miller failed to comply with this
rule. Hence the arrest was unlawful, and evidence seized following the ille-
gal arrest was suppressed. Thus in Schram, the court reasoned, the evidence
must be suppressed where the rule for warrantless misdemeanor arrest was
not followed, even though the arresting officer had probable cause to believe
that Schram had committed an offense. 93
In its brief opinion, the court of appeals makes no reference to the issue of
public safety which is present in all drunk driving cases. Consideration of
this issue calls for prompt arrest of persons who drive while intoxicated so
that evidence of blood alcohol content is not lost. This issue was a factor in
the trial court's decision.94
Nor does the court of appeals address the desirability of an amendment to
the existing arrest statute. An amendment could authorize police to arrest
without a warrant on probable cause to believe that the offense of driving
while intoxicated had been committed.95 Such an amendment would be a
88. 283 N.C. at 556, 196 S.E.2d at 706. For a discussion of Eubanks, see supra note 43
and accompanying text.
89. Schram, 485 A.2d at 625.
90. 357 U.S. 301 (1958). Accarino v. United States, 179 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1949)
reaches essentially the same holding as Miller.
91. Miller, 357 U.S. at 313-14.
92. 357 U.S. at 314. See 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1982).
93. Schram, 485 A.2d at 625.
94. Schram, 112 Wash. Daily L. Rep. at 172, col. 1.
95. Such an amendment was submitted for consideration to the District of Columbia
Council on Jan. 14, 1985. See infra note 96.
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pragmatic solution to the intractable problem of whether the offense is com-
mitted in the presence of the arresting officer.
IV. CONCLUSION
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has taken a narrow view of the
statutory provision for warrantless misdemeanor arrest. In Schram, the
court held that the offense of driving under the influence is not committed in
the police officer's presence where the officer arrives on the scene and the
defendant is no longer in the car. This view contrasts with that taken by the
trial court. The trial court, employing a broader reading of the arrest rule,
found that the offense was committed in the officer's presence where the
facts were such that the officer could reasonably conclude that the offense
was committed in his or her presence.
Now that the narrow view of presence has been adopted in the District of
Columbia, the Council of the District of Columbia is in the position to take
action to strengthen the arrest powers of the police in drunk driving cases.
This action can amend the D.C. Code arrest provisions to facilitate convic-
tion of drunk drivers who are arrested but were not operating a car in the
presence of the police.96
J. Bradley Ortins
96. In a proposed amendment to the D.C. Code, the police would be granted authority to
arrest without a warrant for the misdemeanor of driving under the influence, D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 40-716(b) (Supp. 1985), among other traffic offenses. This authority would be granted where
the officer has probable cause to believe that, unless the suspect is immediately arrested, "relia-
ble evidence of alcohol or drug use may not be available or the person may cause personal
injury or property damage." Major Traffic Offense Arrest Act of 1985, Bill No. 6-85 (submit-
ted to D.C. Council Jan. 16, 1985) (proposed amendment to D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-581 (1981
& Supp. 1985)).* The D.C. Code arrest provision currently authorizes warrantless arrest for
the misdemeanors of theft, assault, unlawful entry, shoplifting and attempted burglary where
evidence will be destroyed if an immediate arrest is not made. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-
581(a)(1)(C), (a)(2) (1981 & Supp. 1985).
*As of press date, this bill has been referred to the Judiciary Committee of the D.C. Coun-
cil, and further action is pending.
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